182 /411 cont./
792 it manages, in voluntary isolation, to remain apart from the
795 Makhzen /makhzan/.

*631 However that may be, the long influence of the religious
792 leaders in the past leaves no traces in a large part of the South of
178 Morocco in our day other than the presence of their respected tombs; their descendants live without glory in poor villages, and the only role that they still can play is to arbitrate simple family quarrels. In former times they tried to stop the evolution of the country threatened by the Makhzen by exerting in favor of the tribes a resistance that permitted them to found states. But in the course of the /412/ last century, the progress of the Empire made exercise of their authority impossible; the history of the last generations shows us no more than the almost regular seesaw of the conquests of the Makhzen and the sibas, the opposition of the chiefs and the assemblies. Two irreducible hostile forces, two irreconcilable conceptions of political life take each other's measure in the Sous as in a closed field, and the mediation of the religious powers can no longer usefully be exercised to attenuate the violence of the struggle.

*631 VI. Consequences of the tribes' submission to the Makhzen.
648 -- In spite of the efforts of the tribes and the revolts that followed
•17 the end of the sultans' reigns, the nineteenth century was marked in the south of Morocco by the constant progress of the policy of the Makhzen /makhzan/. During the confused period of the first years of the French occupation, moreover, the great chiefs of the mountains and the kaids of the plains for 15 years proceeded with the transformation of the Berbère /Berber/ country with new activity.

Consequently, no region of Morocco enables us to perceive as well as the Sous does the consequences that their entrance into the Sherifian Empire entails for the small, formerly autonomous, mountain states.

The only benefit that the Makhzen brought to the Berbère /Berber/ tribes is internal order. Under the government of the
[669] kaids, struggles of soffs and leffs are indeed stopped or limited;
[578]

/412 cont./

*631 this progress still remains precarious, since passions, restrained
648 during the years in which the authority of the Sultan's representa-
•17 tives is exercised without being contested, break out anew at the
[578] first "siba," with a still greater violence. The peace in which
[669] the new subjects then live is bought by the destruction of most of the traditions and customs, habitudes of local government and of primitive justice, which for the inhabitants of the mountains are inseparable from their very life.

[792] The marabouts, whose arbitration was exercised not only to stop the battles of cantons and tribes but also to settle in compliance with equity differences of a private nature, disappeared first; no longer do we see them intervene with sheiks and kaids to defend the poor and weak as they were privileged to do with the senates of "inflas" in the time of freedom. The old tribal law
[671] ceases to be /413/ applied and often the day of submission marks
[693] that of its effacement. It makes way for the more distant and abstract justice of the cadis, whose complaisance toward the new leaders is obvious.

*[634] At the same time, most of the economic institutions of the
[343] small Berbère /Berber/ cantons, whose regular functioning re-
[712] quired the deliberation of family representatives, are smitten with
[652] decline; the agadirs fall in ruins, the common treasuries are
[466] squandered, the corvées for mutual aid become irregular, main-
[653] tenance of the séguias and roads, even the protection of the crops are no longer the object of the same care as in former times.

[423] Finally, ownership of the land, so profoundly disturbed in cer-
[166] tain regions near the casbahs of the great chiefs, becomes uncertain; the constitution of the large domains of the kaids of the Atlas entails, in a country already too poor to feed its inhabitants, the disappearance of a large number of villages and the progressive exodus of the Berbères /Berbers/ toward regions where the security of possessions and persons is more certain.

[735] When the domination of the Makhzen /makhzan/ is established without intermediaries and allows all its weight to bear down on the tribes, thanks to the unlimited authority of foreign leaders, one sees profound poverty develop; one of the most constant principles

*631 /413 cont./
648 of the government is indeed to keep the most turbulent popula-
-17 tions, or the ones most intense about winning back their liberty,
[735] calm by crushing them with ceaselessly renewed contributions.

It is easy to understand that the Berbères /Berbers/, thus shut
*631 up in this field of ruins, soon come to associate in their minds
648 the Makhzen with a regime of peace, oppression, and poverty,
17 while the more disturbed government of the independent republics
153 alone seems to them capable of preserving the life of the institu-
tions of their villages. In the servitude into which they have
fallen, the development of anarchy appears to them as the only
guarantee of the prosperity of families and of respect for traditions.
[669] The "siba," the revolt, for which the Sultan's death is the awaited
signal, becomes both an instinctive movement of defense against
intolerable domination and an appeal to the internal forces of lib-
eration: consequently, this explains why the first act of the tribe
after destroying the kaid's house is, by a kind of unconscious ges-
ture of the collective memory, to assemble the notables /414/ in
order to restore, in a form that we still recognize, the patriarchal
government of ancient times.

648 VII. The future of Moroccan Berbérie /Barbary/. -- For 20
years the establishment of France in Morocco has entirely modified
the respective situation of the Makhzen /makhzan/ and the inde-
pendent tribes. But it is especially since the period in which the
progress of pacification multiplied our direct relations with the
populations of the former "bled es siba" that the Berbère /Berber/
country has manifested, sometimes under tragic circumstances,
signs of a vitality whose deep meaning we may henceforth no
longer hide from ourselves.

During the first years of our Protectorate, the problems of our
establishment and the organization of a country ruined by revolts
were first of all associated with the restoration of the decadent in-
stitutions of the Sherifian Empire. The natural play of diplomatic
action, the obligations of international treaties -- whose tenor im-
plied the existence of a Morocco similar to the European states,
united, centralized, regularly governed according to definite